मेघदूत: "नीचैर्गच्छत्युपरि दशा चक्रनेमिक्रमेण"

समर्थ शिष्या अक्का : "स्वामीच्या कृपाप्रसादे हे सर्व नश्वर आहे असे समजले. पण या नश्वरात तमाशा बहुत आहे."

G C Lichtenberg: “It is as if our languages were confounded: when we want a thought, they bring us a word; when we ask for a word, they give us a dash; and when we expect a dash, there comes a piece of bawdy.”

C. P. Cavafy: "I’d rather look at things than speak about them."

Martin Amis: “Gogol is funny, Tolstoy in his merciless clarity is funny, and Dostoyevsky, funnily enough, is very funny indeed; moreover, the final generation of Russian literature, before it was destroyed by Lenin and Stalin, remained emphatically comic — Bunin, Bely, Bulgakov, Zamyatin. The novel is comic because life is comic (until the inevitable tragedy of the fifth act);...”

सदानंद रेगे: "... पण तुकारामाची गाथा ज्या धुंदीनं आजपर्यंत वाचली जात होती ती धुंदी माझ्याकडे नाहीय. ती मला येऊच शकत नाही याचं कारण स्वभावतःच मी नास्तिक आहे."

".. त्यामुळं आपण त्या दारिद्र्याच्या अनुभवापलीकडे जाऊच शकत नाही. तुम्ही जर अलीकडची सगळी पुस्तके पाहिलीत...तर त्यांच्यामध्ये त्याच्याखेरीज दुसरं काही नाहीच आहे. म्हणजे माणसांच्या नात्यानात्यांतील जी सूक्ष्मता आहे ती क्वचित चितारलेली तुम्हाला दिसेल. कारण हा जो अनुभव आहे... आपले जे अनुभव आहेत ते ढोबळ प्रकारचे आहेत....."

Kenneth Goldsmith: "In 1969 the conceptual artist Douglas Huebler wrote, “The world is full of objects, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add any more.”1 I’ve come to embrace Huebler’s ideas, though it might be retooled as “The world is full of texts, more or less interesting; I do not wish to add any more.” It seems an appropriate response to a new condition in writing today: faced with an unprecedented amount of available text, the problem is not needing to write more of it; instead, we must learn to negotiate the vast quantity that exists. How I make my way through this thicket of information—how I manage it, how I parse it, how I organize and distribute it—is what distinguishes my writing from yours."

Tom Wolfe: "The first line of the doctors’ Hippocratic oath is ‘First, do no harm.’ And I think for the writers it would be: ‘First, entertain.’"

विलास सारंग: "… . . 1000 नंतर ज्या प्रकारची संस्कृती रुढ झाली , त्यामध्ये साधारणत्व विश्वात्मकता हे गुण प्राय: लुप्त झाले...आपली संस्कृती अकाली विश्वात्मक साधारणतेला मुकली आहे."

Friday, March 28, 2025

चाऊ एन लाय आणि आमचे बालपण...Dragon Chou En-Lai and His Tragic Death

१९६२च्या आधीचा माझा जन्म, माझ्या रस्त्यावरील खेळत्या वयात- ज्यावेळी अजून आमच्या मिरजेच्या घरासमोरील रस्ता डांबरी सुद्धा झाला नव्हता- चीन युद्धाची आठवण कायम असे....आम्ही चिनी लोकांबद्दल ते झुरळे आणि पाली खातात असे कायम म्हणत असू... अर्थात तो आमचा चीनला "हरवण्याचा" लटका प्रयत्न असे... 

हे बहुदा १९६५, ६६ सातपर्यंत चालले असावे... 

नंतर माझा चीनचा असा संबंध आम्ही अप्पर आसाम मध्ये रहात असताना (१९८९-१९९२) काळात आला... चिनी सेना  ज्या छबुआ गावापर्यंत १९६२  साली पोचली होती, त्या गावातून आम्ही अनेकवेळा प्रवास केला... 

माझ्या लहानपणी  चाऊ एन लाय हे नाव आणि हिंदी-चिनी भाई भाई घोषणा अगदी घरोघरी पोचले होते.... 

Zhou Enlai: a life, 2024 हे पुस्तक २०२४ साली पाहण्यात आले आणि मी उत्सुकतेने त्यातील भारतावर केलेले भाष्य शोधू लागलो ...

"...Zhou’s trip to India had failed. He had never felt so powerless. He realized that the border disputes were far more complicated than he had perceived. Moreover, his intuition told him that the optimal moment for resolving the border dispute with India was likely gone forever. On several later occasions, he said that Nehru was the “most arrogant” person and the person “most difficult to deal with” he had encountered in his career....

...despite its total victory on the battlefield, China had taken the initiative to stop operations and unilaterally retreat to twenty kilometers behind the Line of Actual Control that stood before Nehru adopted the “forward policy.” This was unprecedented in world history. However, not only Western countries, such as the United States and Britain, but also many Asian and African countries had accused China of resorting to the use of force. The key here was that India’s implementation of the “forward policy” had been carried out in a series of small and unannounced moves. Despite China’s repeated protests, the mainstream international media almost never reported these moves. By comparison, China’s large-scale counteroffensive was so big that it immediately caught the world’s attention. Nehru thus was able to present India as the victim on the international scene. Furthermore, Nehru had long been an influential fighter for anticolonialism, a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and an advocate of democracy. Consequently, India easily won the sympathy of countries friendly to both India and China, which was beyond Zhou’s expectations....

...When almost the whole world condemned China after the outbreak of the Sino-Indian War, Moscow’s attitude was exceptional. Keeping Khrushchev’s promise to the Chinese ambassador Liu Xiao, the Soviet government changed its previous stance of neutrality and stood explicitly on China’s side. In a memo to Beijing on October 22, Moscow stated that the Soviet Union endorsed China’s position on the war. More specifically, regarding the “McMahon Line,” Moscow declared that it “supports China’s stand, that is, it is not an established borderline, but a legacy of the tragic historical past.”..."

 २०२४ साली जग बदलेले आहे, आज ते  भारताच्या मागे ठामपणे उभे राहील का?

चाऊ एन लाय यांचे शेवटचे दिवस माओ यांच्या मुळे अत्यंत वाईट गेले, वाचा Jung Chang & Jon Halliday यांचे पुस्तक "Mao: The Unknown Story" , 2005.

"IN MID-MAY 1972, shortly after Nixon’s visit, it was discovered that Chou En-lai had cancer of the bladder. Under Mao, even a life-threatening illness was not just a medical matter. Mao controlled when and how his Politburo members could receive treatment. The doctors had to report first to Mao. They requested immediate surgery for Chou, stressing that the cancer was at an early stage, and that prompt action could cure it.

On 31 May, Mao decreed: “First: keep it secret, and don’t tell the premier or [his wife]. Second: no examination. Third: no surgery …”

Mao’s pretexts for vetoing treatment were that Chou was “old” (he was seventy-four), had “heart trouble,” and that surgery was “useless.” But Mao himself was seventy-eight, and had worse heart problems, yet surgeons and anesthetists were on stand-by for him...

...The doctors’ entreaty to Mao for proper surgery met with a brutal reply on 9 May 1974: “Operations are ruled out for now. Absolutely no room for argument.” Mao intended to let the tumor eat Chou to death unimpeded. Chou himself then practically begged, via the four top leaders designated by Mao to supervise his medical “care.” At this point, Mao reluctantly gave his consent: “Let him see Tun Razak and then we’ll talk about it.” Razak, the Malaysian prime minister, was due at the end of the month, and Chou went into the hospital on 1 June—after he had signed the communiqué establishing diplomatic relations with Malaysia. It was only now that he was allowed his first proper operation, two years after his cancer had been diagnosed. This delay made sure that he died nineteen months later, and before Mao...."